We are delighted at the interest shown in our paper by Dr Jolobe and Professor Seymour and agree with both correspondents that all patients, whatever their age or physical or mental handicap, deserve individual assessment of the potential risks and bene®ts of any surgical or medical intervention.
We were, however, saddened by Professor Seymour's criticism of our attitude to older patients, and in particular his implication that we are somehow denying elderly patients appropriate surgical treatment on the basis of a hearing-aid or the use of a wheelchair. The hearing-aid and the wheelchair were only part of the description of the circumstances of the hypothetical patients described in Box 2, and used to test a hypothesis that surgeons consider physical, mental and social factors in addition to chronological age and medical co-morbidity when striving to make the best decision for an elderly patient.
As general surgeons we too work daily with older people, and many of those on whom we operate are in their 80s and 90s. We are aware that some patients are in advanced old age in their 70s and others not until nearly 100. It was this anomaly that we were trying to address when using the phrase`biological age' and must apologize if our understanding of its de®nition was inaccurate. The star rating scale is simply a measure of the physical, mental and social limitations advancing age has placed on an individual. We are not preoccupied with cognitive dysfunction. It is merely taken into consideration, alongside physical independence and social functioning, to which Professor Seymour also objects.
We no more`demote' patients by describing them as old for their age' than by describing a mature child as à post-pubertal eleven-year-old'. We do not make value judgments in our paper. The paper only addresses whether the physical, mental and social limitations associated with advancing age, as distinct from chronological age itself, are in¯uential factors for a surgeon trying to make the right decision for a patient.
woman who is defective. The term defective is now obsolete, but has the same de®nition as severe mental impairment under the 1983 Mental Health Act, without the need to show abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct. In this case there seems to have been ample forensic evidence that sexual intercourse had occurred and DNA evidence to back up the client's testimony naming the man concerned. There is an assumption within this Act that the woman concerned cannot competently consent, which makes the intercourse consequently unlawful. The article by Peter Young and colleagues (May 2001 JRSM, pp. 226±231) makes depressing reading for those of us who believe that medical management should be adjudged by outcome in terms of somatic or psychic wellbeing. What it shows is that mismanagement (increasing unnecessary intervention) is likely to reduce the number and/or scale of compensation awards to the parents of brain-damaged babies, albeit it is acknowledged that fetal and neonatal brain damage is extremely unlikely to be the result of not undertaking such intervention or to be reduced by making it mandatory; in other words, the transaction is purely a matter of what is or is not regarded as optimal care by a judge and jury misled by expert witnesses citing arbitrary standards or by a sentimental feeling that parents of brain damaged babies should be given the bene®t of the doubt even at the expense of the truth, the good repute of the professional birth attendants concerned, and of NHS funds. This will result in cutting back aspects of patient care of proven value in order both to pay the damages awarded and for the meddlesome measures designed to persuade the courts that no possible negligence was involved. Is this really the kind of`medicine' that we want; or should we offer ®nancial succour to those in need of it regardless of whether anyone is to blame for what is in effect an inevitable statistical fall-out of our hazardous way of reproducing ourselves. Where there has been real negligence, the authorities on whom the cost falls could then themselves recover it by due legal process without the onus of doing so falling directly on the injured party. Much anxiety, delay and expense could thereby be avoided and funds made available by the taxpayer for the alleviation of misfortune would not end up mostly in the pockets of lawyers but of those in need. The pharmacist showed us his collection of about a dozen, kept in a moist box in his refrigerator. He told us that he received one or two calls a year for them, almost exclusively from lay persons, but occasionally from medical practitioners. He did not elaborate on how he obtained his supply. That pharmacy existed for several years afterwards, presumably supplying leeches on demand.
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